This again is not my effort. But as you see the author has signed at the bottom. I have posted this here only so that if someone loses his way and ends up in my blog, then he should read this.
QUOTE
To,
The President of India, 3rd July 2009
INTRODUCTION
The case of Capt Glen Aroza of Mangalore, India, detained since 17 April 2009 taken at gunpoint from the high seas, to HuaLien, Republic of China(Taiwan), was referred to DG Shipping and Ministries of Shipping and External Affairs but there has been no cogent response at all from any of these authorities so far, and they have not informed Mrs Preetha Aroza about factual information obtained from ROC Taiwan, if any collected. A 2nd Officer (Bangladesh) is held in jail while AB Edwardo (Phillipines) is detained. Even earlier DG Shipping did nothing when Capt Raj Goel of India (Panama Flag, Japanese owner) was kept in Keelung, Taiwan Jail/ detention from 7 February 1996 to 22 June 1999, in gross violation of well settled international law and human rights principles. Mrs Preetha Aroza has requested me to take up this matter on her behalf.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The law creating processes are:
1. International law in unorganised international societies(international customary law).
2. General principles of law recognised by civilized nations.
3. Treaties.
One of the 7 fundamental principles of international customary law is:
"Freedom of the High Seas" which has been formalised in Article 11 etc of UNCLOS 1958 / Articles 86, 87, 97 etc of UNCLOS 1982, derived from Articles 1, 2 & 3 of the 1952 Convention [ Brussels, 10 May 1952, 439 UNTS 233; UKTS No. 47 (1960). Cmd. 1128]
Another of the 7 fundamental principles of international customary law is:
"International Responsibility" which has two major propositions:
1. Breach constitutes an international tort.
2. Commission of an international tort involves the duty to make reparation.
Interaction of the rules governing the fundamental principles of international customary law:
1. Protection of nationals abroad; this rule has behind it the authority of the PCIJ, Permanent Court of International Justice & a host of international tribunals.
2. Freedom of Commerce & Navigation. In 1956, the International Law Commission, in its draft article 35, followed the approach of the 1952 Convention, stating that its position had the object of protecting ships and their crews from the risk of penal proceedings before foreign courts in the event of collision on the high seas, since such proceedings may constitute an intolerable interference with international navigation.[Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its eighth session (A/3159), article 35 Commentary, para. (1), II YB ILC 1956, at 253, 281]
INCONSISTENCY OF TAIWANESE INTERPRETATION OF JURISDICTION ON HIGH SEAS WHEN FOREIGN NATIONALS ALLEGED TO BE INVOLVED IN COLLISION
"Maersk Dubai" 1996 - alleged butchering of 3 innocent boys on 2 separate dates at sea - "A Taiwanese diplomat in Ottawa, Leonard Chao of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, was quoted as follows “even if an investigation concludes that these allegations are true and the officers are shown to have contravened out country’s criminal code, the case will be dealt with accordingly by our law enforcement authorities. Other than the fact that the ship was Taiwanese, the accused officers (Captain-Shiou Cheng, Chief Officer-Chung-Chih Wu, Second Officer, First Mate, Chief Cook, Carpenter, and Chief Engineer) should be tried in their home state, not the state the crime was committed against. Thus, it is clear that the Republic of China has a right to demand the return of the Taiwanese sailors for the purpose of prosecution for the alleged offenses." Taiwan threatened to recall its representative from Canada as per media reports.
Nova Scotia Supreme Court in case of 7 Taiwanese officers who were arraigned before it noted as follows, "The Court noted that but for the lack of jurisdiction it would have committed all of the officers." [Romania v Cheng, (March 6, 1997) No. 128423 (N.S.S.C.) ]
But in the 10 June 2009 case of the "Koshiki" - "Lienhe" incident of alleged entry into Japanese waters / sinking of "Lienhe", Taiwan insisted that Japan release the Taiwanese master who was briefly held for questioning after hot pursuit /sinking of "Lienhe", as it was allegedly not in High Seas at commencement of "hot pursuit". Taiwan threatened to recall its representative from Japan as per media reports.
The NYK Japan Shipping "Tosa" (Panama Flag) case is no longer one that the Government of India can afford to overlook as it concerns Panama (Flag State), Phillipines, Bangladesh & India (Protection of nationals abroad), Taiwan(International tort) and Japan(owner), all of whom have independently signed/ratified the high seas convention on jurisdiction of flag state/crew nationality. This incident is a (second) slap (first being in 1996-1999) on the face of every Citizen of India as it has permitted the human rights of an Indian Citizen to be violated, once again, in breach of well settled international law (international tort requiring reparation) arising from Article 11 of the International Convention on the High Seas signed on 29 April 1958 by, among others, Republic of China (Taiwan), Bangladesh (through Pakistan), and Panama which came into force on September 30, 1962; its successor Article 97 of UNCLOS 1982 signed on 10 December 1982 has been ratified by Phillipines (1984), India (1995), Panama(1996), Japan (1996), Bangladesh(2001). Article 11 of 1958 and Article 97 of 1982. This is on the lines of Articles 1, 2 & 3 of the 1952 Convention [ Brussels, 10 May 1952, 439 UNTS 233; UKTS No. 47 (1960). Cmd. 1128]
TAIWAN ADHERENCE TO UNCLOS AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
That Republic of China (Taiwan) demonstrates adherence to international law notably, Article 97 of UNCLOS 1982, and had been actively participating in PCIJ and ICJ (International Court of Justice) as is apparent from the the record below:
1. The jurisdiction of Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, in matters concerning US- China relations was ratified by Republic of China (established 1912) on 15 September 1914. [ Article II of Treaty of Arbitration between United States of America & Republic of China, 15 September 1914; American Journal of International law, supplement, Vol. X, p. 268]
2. Republic of China was a founding member of the League of Nations on 10 January 1920(ratified 16 July 1920), along with India & Bangladesh (through GB), Japan (withdrew 27 March 1933) and Panama. League of Nations was dissolved 18 April 1946.
3. Statute of the Court of PCIJ was signed by Republic of China on 28 January 1921 and ratified on 13 May 1922.
4. Articles 1 and 2 of Kellogg-Briand Pact, 27 August 1928, "the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means." Ratified by Republic of China (now at Taiwan), India &, Bangladesh, (through GB), Panama, Phillipines (through USA) and Japan.
5. One case was submitted by Republic of China to jurisdiction of PCIJ, Permanent Court of International Justice. ["Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1865 between China and Belgium", PCIJ Order dated 25 May 1929, PCIJ, 1929 Series A, No 18]
6. From Republic of China - Chun Hui Wang was Deputy Judge of PCIJ from 30 January 1920- 6 December 1930 and Judge of PCIJ from 15 January 1931- 15 January 1936; Tien Hsi Cheng was a Judge of PCIJ from 8 October 1936- October 1945.
7. Republic of China was a founding member of the United Nations on 24 October 1945, along with India & Bangladesh (through GB), Phillipines (through USA) and Panama, till passing of Resolution 2758(XXVI) of 25 October 1971, when its place was taken by PRC. Japan had joined the United Nations on 18 December 1956.
8. Upon dissolution of PCIJ on 31 January 1946, Hsu Mo of Republic of China served as a Judge of ICJ from 1946 to 1956. Wellington Koo of Republic of China served as a Judge of ICJ from 1957 to 1964 and as its Vice President from 1964 to 1967.
9. Republic of China (Taiwan) was a member of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, ICMO (IMO since 22 May 1982) on its coming into force on 17 March 1958. Taiwan lost its place in the UN bodies to PRC on 25 Octopber 1971, since it claims to represent entire undivided China as it existed in 1949. Nevertheless Taiwan follows the UNCLOS and engages in co-operation with US, Japan and other countries on the high seas.
TAIWAN STAND ON ARTICLE 97 OF UNCLOS 1982 IN CANADA 1996
On 24 May 1996, when Canadian Police arrested seven Taiwanese (Republic of China) officers after some initial resistance, from the Taiwanese registered Maersk Dubai in a sorrowful saga involving the US, Canada, Romania, Phillipines and Republic of China. On the insistence of a Taiwanese diplomat, Leonard Chao, in Canada the flag state / crew nationality principle of the law of the sea was upheld as contained in Articles 1, 2 & 3 of the 1952 Convention, Article 11 of the International Convention on the High Seas 1958 and Articles 86, 87, 97 of UNCLOS 1982.(All Annexed below) (Detailed reports on the incidents of the "Maersk Dubai" and "Kasuga I" are also annexed.
CONCLUSION
1. It is crystal clear that Taiwan Courts have neither locus nor jurisdiction to commit the foreign crew of "Tosa".
2. The detention of the crew without jurisdiction is severe breach constituting intolerable international tort of vast magnitude, having hurt the psyche of each and everyone of the one billion common citizens of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of India.
3. Threats to severe relations by Taiwan, as reported by media in Canada and Japan to influence the course of justice must be stoutly resisted by the Government of India.
4. Money can not recompense the lost honour and the shame that the alleged sloth of the DG Shipping has brought upon us common citizens but nevertheless this citizen calls upon his Government if there be one to take forthwith action to obtain release of our honour and our citizen. Parliament needs must be seized of this grave matter.
5. Reparation must follow tort as night follows day and a sum of one billion dollars in reparation will hopefully dissuade such distasteful show of aggression by a nation that has adopted double standards in international law for far too long, and no civilization may permit of such continuing inconsistent approach to international judicature.
Regards.
Sarvadaman Oberoi
Colonel (Retd) Indian Army
Tower 1 Flat 1102, The Uniworld Garden,
Sohna Road, Gurgaon 122018 Haryana INDIA
Mobile: +919818768349 Tele: +911244227522
Website: http://www.freewebs.com/homeopathy249/
email: manioberoi@gmail.com
UNQUOTE
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Capt Glenn Aroza in Jail!
I did not write this. I am copying a mail I received. But what you read is very relevant.
For the record I would also like to share an incident I can vouch for. This ship was on a voyage from the Gulf to Japan. A VLCC. When the ship reached Japan the superintendent in charge of the ship calls up the Master to inform him of a claim from a Taiwanese fishing vessel . The VLCC allegedly collided with the fishing vessel. But when the Master asked the office for a time and position of the incident, it turned out that the VLCC was never even there at that time. The case died a natural death.
And then there was the case of Capt Goel who was in Jail for about 3 years sometime in 1996 for an alleged collision during the 3rd Officers Watch!
QUOTE
MOST IMMEDIATE TODAY CAPT. GLEN PATRICK AROZA, MASTER M.T.TOSA, NYK SHIPS -DETENTION IN HUALIEN, TAIWAN SINCE 18 APRIL 2009
“CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS OF ‘ALLEGED’ INVOLVEMENT OF VLCC ‘TOSA’ IN A CLOSE QUARTERS SITUATION WITH A TAIWANESE FISHING TRAWLER
Tosa is a 299996 dwt VLCC delivered on 31.3.08, built in Japan, registered in Panama and managed by NYK ship management, Singapore. LOA 333 mts, breadth 60 mts and depth 29 mts.
Tosa sailed out from Daesan, South Korea on 14.4.09, RFA at 2200 LT, after completing discharge of crude oil, enroute to Singapore for bunkers and further orders.
SMT = GMT+9 (from departure Daesan until 18th April).
TAIWAN MAINTAINS GMT + 8.
17.4.09
0920 – Tosa noticed a Taiwanese Coast Guard vessel “CG 119” coming very close to port quarter, almost 2 cables. Tosa called up CG and asked intentions, if all was OK. CG asked for Tosa’s 0200 hrs position, last port and next port. (Vessel was proceeding at a speed of approx 13.5 knots, the location was off East Coast of Taiwan, in approx 23 degrees latitude, about 45 to 50 miles south east of a port called Hua Lien.)
CG also informed Tosa that there was a collision with a fishing boat at night and two Taiwanese persons (Master and Chief Engineer) were missing, whether Tosa was aware of it. Tosa said no.
Master called up Chief Officer. C/O said that the 2/o had informed him at 0400 hrs that some fishing vessels had come close to Tosa, so he took evasive action and had passed clear.
Master informed Managers (Superintendent Incharge Mr. A. Sarpal) over the phone about the incident and communication with CG, and then on, kept informing Managers of the situation both via phone and email.
0945 - Master called 2/o on bridge and when enquired, 2/O said that there were a few fishing boats in the vicinity, 2 on his stbd side and 2 on his port side, all were maintaining more than 1 mile CPA. Suddenly he saw that the boats on the port side were coming very close and trying to cross the bow from port to stbd, so he altered to port and passed the boats at about 3 to 4 cables and then saw them pass well clear, he also monitored them for sometime until they passed clear and monitored their lights. The above occurred between 0030 and 0100 ships time. When asked why he did not inform master, he said it all happened so suddenly and that he had handled the situation and did not see the reason to call master. (The 2/O is a Bangladeshi age 28, with 2nd mates license and near coastal Mates license issued by Bangladesh. Last two trips of 6 months each as 3rd Officer. First ship as 2nd Officer, first VLCC. Has been onboard since 26th February, already made a similar voyage from S.Korea to Arab Gulf and back).
Master also called AB Edwardo (Filipino, aged 31) and he also narrated similar situation. He was hand steering from 0020 until past 0100.
Both 2/O and AB have given written statements, which were forwarded to Managers. Master also made initial statement basis information given by 2/O and AB, same has been forwarded to Managers.
Earlier, Master had left night orders at 16th/2315 hrs and gone to sleep. Masters standing orders clearly stated CPA of 2 miles in open waters and 1 mile in restricted waters and all conditions for informing / calling master and acknowledged by all Officers onboard. In this case, the vessel was in open sea and the nearest land was 21 miles off. There was no traffic in the vicinity except a few fishing boats here and there. The sea condition was rough sea and swell, force 5, seas on tosa’s port quarter. Currents were against, vessel was doing a speed of approx 12 knots.
Vessel was continuing on passage, CG was following the vessel very closely…
In between 0930 and 1045:
CG asked for more information of vessel, name of Owners, cargo onboard, draft, Masters name, etc. All information as requested was passed onto CG. A record of all vhf communication was maintained in the GMDSS log.
Tosa also confirmed to CG that vessel was maintaining GMT+9 and that the there was a time difference of 1 hour between ships time and Taiwan time. Besides, the alleged location of capsizing was one hour away from Tosa’ sposition at the said time. (In GMT)
At about 1000 hrs:
Tosa received a navtex from Japan radio which stated sunken fishing boat in said position and said time. Tosa was approximately 1 hour away from this position, at the alleged time of capsizing of the fishing trawler.
The location of the alleged capsizing / sinking was approximately 21 n.miles off a Japanese island named Utsuori Shima, about more than 50 miles off the North Eastern coast of Taiwan.
At about 1100: CG asked Tosa to stop as they wanted to carry out inspection of ships side and board the vessel for some enquiry. Master immediately informed managers and stopped the vessel and fully cooperated with the Coast Guards.
Alcohol check of 2/O and AB was carried out, nil record. At around noon, SVDR information was saved.
The coast guards carried out inspection of the ships side, but could not board the vessel as the sea condition was rough.
At around 1230 hrs: CG thanked Tosa for cooperation and said sorry for interfering with voyage and that they did not find any crash marks on the ships side. When Tosa asked whether vessel could continue on voyage to Singapore, CG said please wait as awaiting orders from base.
At around 1300: CG said please proceed to calling port. Tosa confirmed whether to proceed to Singapore. CG said No, Proceed to Hua Lien for investigation. Master immediately informed managers and informed CG that Tosa was awaiting instructions from Managers to deviate from intended voyage.
All this while, vessel maintained a position of approx 35 to 40 miles from nearest Taiwan coast, by drifting, about 40 miles SE of Hua Lien, strong currents and rough sea pushed the vessel closer towards land and vessel maintained position as much as possible on course line, more than 36 miles off coast of Taiwan.
Between 17th /1300 and 18th / 1200:
Vessel maintained position, informed CG that Tosa was awaiting instructions from Managers. Also passed on Managers contact details to the CG. During this time CG also threatened the vessel that if Tosa did not follow their orders, the CG vessels and aircrafts would use force for Tosa to proceed to Port. They were insisting that Tosa proceed to Hua Lien immediately. Fearing threat to Vessel and crew, Master maintained position and awaited further instructions from Managers, assuring the CG119 of Tosa’s full cooperation at all times.
On 18th April 09, at around 1230 hrs:
Tosa received confirmation from Managers NYKSM, Singapore, to proceed to Hua Lien for further investigation, after they consulted with their P&I, H&M and legal and insurance departments.
At 1300 hrs:
Vessel proceeded to Hua lien, escorted by two CG vessels. Tosa retarded clock by 1 hour to make SMT = GMT +8.
1630:
Vessel arrived Hua Lien, 5 miles east of breakwater and drifted, using engines continuously. Strong currents and sea condition restricted vessel from approaching any closer. Local agent, P&I surveyor, H&M surveyor and Managers appointed lawyer boarded the vessel. All information requested by the surveyors was given, after consultation with lawyer.
The CG team of 13 members boarded vessel at around 1900 and carried out investigation until midnight. All information requested by CG was given, after consultation with the lawyer. The CG team left at 19th / 0010 hrs.
The Port State Control inspectors (2 persons) boarded at around 1945 hrs and departed at 2030 hrs. They informed master that they would return the following day for PSC inspection. They too asked for some ships information which was given after consulting the Lawyer.
19.4.09
0930: The Lawyer, surveyors, agent, C/Officer, 2/Officer and AB left vessel. They went for investigation / enquiry to CG Office at Hua Lien.
The C/O returned at 2330 hrs. The AB and 2/O were asked to stay back for further enquiry.
CO was asked questions related to the daily operations onboard and in particular if he knew anything as to what happened during the 12 to 4 watch of the said day. The Lawyer was present during this questioning.
20.4.09
Vessel was drifting about 8 miles off Hua Lien port the full day. A CG vessel was patrolling close by and monitoring all moves of Tosa. 2/o and AB were taken to local prosecutor’s office for enquiry and investigation. An interpreter was arranged. Tosa was accused of collision, negligence, manslaughter and hit and run. All information requested by CG, Lawyers, surveyor and Managers was passed on after consulting. Several crafts with lot of cameramen and other persons made circles of the vessel during the course of the day. None were allowed to board the vessel.
21.4.09
CG called up vessel and informed that divers will approach the vessel for inspection. The vessel maneuvered to 2.5 miles off the breakwater. The diver then realized that the current was more than 3 knots. The CG called the vessel and informed that underwater inspection / diving was cancelled as it was too dangerous for the diver.
However, a small CG raft closely inspected the entire ships side.
They found a white coloured buoy of size 1 foot height and 20 cms dia with a messenger line hanging at the rudder, they cut it and loaded it onto the CG vessel and took it away for investigation.
The vessel was stbd side alongside during discharge at Daesan. As per Managers requirement, a complete vessels report has to be sent on CD to the Managers every 6 months, which includes photos of ships side. The Chief Officer had taken pictures of the ships side while at Daesan. He had the photos of this buoy, marker and rope, which were noticed on 14th April. He had not informed Master as it slipped out of his mind. He was busy with discharge and then with paperwork after departure. He remembered the same only when the CG found the marker and the rope. The photos were immediately sent to the managers. It was later confirmed by the fishing trawler company that the buoy and rope did not belong to them.
Today, at 1400 hrs, the Chief of Coast Guards Capt. Fang came onboard to take a copy of the ships SVDR.
22.4.09
Master was called for investigation. On 21st, the Managers had arranged for a standby Master and 2/o, as they felt that the prosecutors were insisting that the Master was needed for the investigation. On 22nd, the standby Master and 2/O boarded the vessel and Self disembarked at 0800 hrs to proceed for investigation. There was no change of command or any hand over. The standby master was called in for the safety of the vessel, as informed by the COO of NYKSM.
Self was taken to the district prosecutor’s office. I was asked a few questions between 1030 hrs and 1245 hrs and 1355 to 1410 hrs. Most of my answers were – “I am not aware, as I was asleep / off duty / I had left standing instructions and night orders to be called if in doubt”. I was asked regarding a few navigation watch hand over / take over procedures onboard. The remaining questions were mostly on my opinion as Master, what I would do in such a situation. A lot of time was spent on the translation part. All communication by the prosecutor was in Chinese. The Lawyer was present during the entire proceeding. All papers were signed by self with remarks “I do not understand Chinese”. This was instructed by the Lawyer.
During this time, the 2/O and AB were questioned separately in different rooms.
23.4.09
2/O and AB were questioned. Self had to wait.
Today, the Hua Lien Port State Control boarded the vessel and carried out inspection between 1430 hrs and 1730 hrs. They gave the vessel a clean chit and found no deficiencies. Earlier, vessel also had a PSC inspection at Daesan on 14.4.09 with two deficiencies, both related to certification, involving Class. Annual Class surveys (NKK) were held at Fujairah, UAE on 17.3.09.
24.4.09
I was asked questions on the radar pictures obtained from the SVDR between 1000 hrs and 1215 hrs. Again, a lot of time was spent on translation. I had to explain a few radar terms as to what is CPA, TCPA, how the targets are plotted, what are the alarm settings on the radar etc.
At 1350, I was called in along with the Lawyer and told that I am now a witness in this case and that anything I say will be used as evidence against the word of the 2nd officer and AB. So I have to speak the truth. If I am found lying I will be jailed for 7 years or less. As I was not aware of what the prosecutor was talking about, he allowed me 10 minutes to discuss this with the lawyer in private and return.
The Lawyer suggested that I agree to be a witness as I was not around / off duty during the time of the incident. We then returned to the court room and I signed a Chinese paper which read the same thing as was explained by the lawyer. He read it out to me. I put a remark that I do not understand Chinese. I was then asked to remain in Taiwan and fully co-operate until the case is solved.
All the above occurred between 1350 and 1410 hrs.
26.4.09
Panama ambassador to China, a Panama Lawyer, deputy Mayor of Hualien and the ambassador’s assistant visited me at my hotel and took my statement. They were meeting with the External affairs ministry the following day and also the Chief Prosecutor. They have assured me of their full support and assistance in sorting out this matter as soon as possible.
28.4.09
2/O and AB were called for investigation. As per their information, same questions were repeated.
The Junior C/O (8 to 12 watch keeper who had handed over to 2/o) was also called for investigation today. He was asked similar questions as to his duties onboard, procedure of hand over and take over, what happened on midnight of the said day etc.
29.4.09
Today, the district Chief Prosecutor, along with the coast guards and local police, boarded Tosa around sunset time and carried out further investigation. They took pictures of the general layout of the vessel, tried out the GMDSS / distress system, and checked the radar operation and a few other items. They also simulated the situation with the CG boat coming close to the bow of Tosa and checked the range of visibility etc.
30.4.09
2/O, AB and self were called at 2315 hrs and asked if we had anything to supplement our previous records or statements. I had none.
Later, 2/O and AB were again called inside the court room at 2345 hrs. They were charged with negligence, manslaughter and hit and run. The 2/O was immediately hand cuffed and the AB has been told not to leave Hua Lien city without permission from the court.
1st May 09
Tosa sailed out around 1800 hrs, after signing a letter of undertaking with the owners of the fishing trawler. The Junior C/O returned to the vessel.
AB and self have been in a guest house since 2nd May. We are taken care of well, no harassment or ill treatment of any kind. The lawyer (who is based in Taipei) strongly advised us not to visit the 2/o in jail. The 2/o’s bail plea has been rejected. We are awaiting a hearing or a first verdict from the local court. No news yet. The Lawyer has asked me to be optimistic as I was not on duty and that the 2/O and AB have confirmed that they did not call me. He has asked me to be patient and cooperate with the authorities.
A few additional points:
1. I have seen the SVDR radar pictures. The targets seem very close, up to 3 cables off, but no judgement can be made as the clutter is too strong. The sea condition was rough, force 5, rough sea and swell. There appears to be no contact though, as the targets seem to have passed well clear. I have told the prosecutor that I am unable to make any judgement on scanty radar information as per the rules and in situations at such close range, the targets are usually monitored by visual, using binoculars.
2. The vessel passed Singapore on 7th May, underwater survey was carried out and no damage or scratches have been found anywhere, except anchor chain marks. The remaining length of the rope and some nets were found but already confirmed not belonging to the fishing trawler. The prosecutor had shown me a picture of the bulbous bow and asked me what the scratch marks were. I had told him that as per my knowledge they are anchor chain marks.
3. Unaware of the VHF communication recording of the SVDR during the incident as vessel did not have software to decode the recording. Had enquired with 2/O and AB, they had confirmed several times that neither did they hear any distress call nor receive any message regarding any assistance required. They had seen the boat pass well clear with all lights fully on.
4. The trawler named “SHINGTONG CHEN #86” was salvaged and towed to a nearby port called SUAO where survey was carried out only by the fishing company’s reps. Tosa’s reps were not allowed to join in the survey. The body of the Chief Engineer was found in the engine room bottom. The Master is still missing. Pictures of the fishing trawler after recovery are available, no signs of damage on the hull of the fishing boat whatsoever. Besides, a few crew of the fishing trawler have given statement that there was no actual contact between the two vessels. The actual reason for the capsize of the trawler is not known.
5. Understand that the Letter Of Undertaking was signed for an amount of USD five million. USD400,000/- each has been paid to the families of Master and Chief engineer.
6. Self have made a sea protest regarding this incident and got it notarized as advised by Lawyer and P&I.
6. Tosa has RT flex engines, whereby, revolutions of the ME can be adjusted very easily, for the purpose of bunker saving. Vessel was proceeding at 54 rpm from Daesan to Singapore as per Charterers instructions. (The max rpm is 71). However, daily, whilst vessel is at sea, rpm is increased to 66 for one hour in the morning and evening, for the purpose of soot blowing. At the time of interception by CG, vessel was gradually increasing speed for the morning soot blowing and speed had increased to almost 16.5 knots. The CG increased their speed to more than 17 knots and kept following the vessel.
Its almost two months now. There has been no progress. The 2/o is still in jail. The AB was called for investigation on 3rd June and released on a guarantee of usd16,000/-.
I am still not aware why i am asked to stay back in Taiwan. I was told that i am now being investigated to find out if Master has trained the 2/0 and AB adequately. My reply was that I am not responsible for their training, they are certified by their respective governments. So, i was told that the investigation is not over, have patience!!!!!”
For the record I would also like to share an incident I can vouch for. This ship was on a voyage from the Gulf to Japan. A VLCC. When the ship reached Japan the superintendent in charge of the ship calls up the Master to inform him of a claim from a Taiwanese fishing vessel . The VLCC allegedly collided with the fishing vessel. But when the Master asked the office for a time and position of the incident, it turned out that the VLCC was never even there at that time. The case died a natural death.
And then there was the case of Capt Goel who was in Jail for about 3 years sometime in 1996 for an alleged collision during the 3rd Officers Watch!
QUOTE
MOST IMMEDIATE TODAY CAPT. GLEN PATRICK AROZA, MASTER M.T.TOSA, NYK SHIPS -DETENTION IN HUALIEN, TAIWAN SINCE 18 APRIL 2009
“CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS OF ‘ALLEGED’ INVOLVEMENT OF VLCC ‘TOSA’ IN A CLOSE QUARTERS SITUATION WITH A TAIWANESE FISHING TRAWLER
Tosa is a 299996 dwt VLCC delivered on 31.3.08, built in Japan, registered in Panama and managed by NYK ship management, Singapore. LOA 333 mts, breadth 60 mts and depth 29 mts.
Tosa sailed out from Daesan, South Korea on 14.4.09, RFA at 2200 LT, after completing discharge of crude oil, enroute to Singapore for bunkers and further orders.
SMT = GMT+9 (from departure Daesan until 18th April).
TAIWAN MAINTAINS GMT + 8.
17.4.09
0920 – Tosa noticed a Taiwanese Coast Guard vessel “CG 119” coming very close to port quarter, almost 2 cables. Tosa called up CG and asked intentions, if all was OK. CG asked for Tosa’s 0200 hrs position, last port and next port. (Vessel was proceeding at a speed of approx 13.5 knots, the location was off East Coast of Taiwan, in approx 23 degrees latitude, about 45 to 50 miles south east of a port called Hua Lien.)
CG also informed Tosa that there was a collision with a fishing boat at night and two Taiwanese persons (Master and Chief Engineer) were missing, whether Tosa was aware of it. Tosa said no.
Master called up Chief Officer. C/O said that the 2/o had informed him at 0400 hrs that some fishing vessels had come close to Tosa, so he took evasive action and had passed clear.
Master informed Managers (Superintendent Incharge Mr. A. Sarpal) over the phone about the incident and communication with CG, and then on, kept informing Managers of the situation both via phone and email.
0945 - Master called 2/o on bridge and when enquired, 2/O said that there were a few fishing boats in the vicinity, 2 on his stbd side and 2 on his port side, all were maintaining more than 1 mile CPA. Suddenly he saw that the boats on the port side were coming very close and trying to cross the bow from port to stbd, so he altered to port and passed the boats at about 3 to 4 cables and then saw them pass well clear, he also monitored them for sometime until they passed clear and monitored their lights. The above occurred between 0030 and 0100 ships time. When asked why he did not inform master, he said it all happened so suddenly and that he had handled the situation and did not see the reason to call master. (The 2/O is a Bangladeshi age 28, with 2nd mates license and near coastal Mates license issued by Bangladesh. Last two trips of 6 months each as 3rd Officer. First ship as 2nd Officer, first VLCC. Has been onboard since 26th February, already made a similar voyage from S.Korea to Arab Gulf and back).
Master also called AB Edwardo (Filipino, aged 31) and he also narrated similar situation. He was hand steering from 0020 until past 0100.
Both 2/O and AB have given written statements, which were forwarded to Managers. Master also made initial statement basis information given by 2/O and AB, same has been forwarded to Managers.
Earlier, Master had left night orders at 16th/2315 hrs and gone to sleep. Masters standing orders clearly stated CPA of 2 miles in open waters and 1 mile in restricted waters and all conditions for informing / calling master and acknowledged by all Officers onboard. In this case, the vessel was in open sea and the nearest land was 21 miles off. There was no traffic in the vicinity except a few fishing boats here and there. The sea condition was rough sea and swell, force 5, seas on tosa’s port quarter. Currents were against, vessel was doing a speed of approx 12 knots.
Vessel was continuing on passage, CG was following the vessel very closely…
In between 0930 and 1045:
CG asked for more information of vessel, name of Owners, cargo onboard, draft, Masters name, etc. All information as requested was passed onto CG. A record of all vhf communication was maintained in the GMDSS log.
Tosa also confirmed to CG that vessel was maintaining GMT+9 and that the there was a time difference of 1 hour between ships time and Taiwan time. Besides, the alleged location of capsizing was one hour away from Tosa’ sposition at the said time. (In GMT)
At about 1000 hrs:
Tosa received a navtex from Japan radio which stated sunken fishing boat in said position and said time. Tosa was approximately 1 hour away from this position, at the alleged time of capsizing of the fishing trawler.
The location of the alleged capsizing / sinking was approximately 21 n.miles off a Japanese island named Utsuori Shima, about more than 50 miles off the North Eastern coast of Taiwan.
At about 1100: CG asked Tosa to stop as they wanted to carry out inspection of ships side and board the vessel for some enquiry. Master immediately informed managers and stopped the vessel and fully cooperated with the Coast Guards.
Alcohol check of 2/O and AB was carried out, nil record. At around noon, SVDR information was saved.
The coast guards carried out inspection of the ships side, but could not board the vessel as the sea condition was rough.
At around 1230 hrs: CG thanked Tosa for cooperation and said sorry for interfering with voyage and that they did not find any crash marks on the ships side. When Tosa asked whether vessel could continue on voyage to Singapore, CG said please wait as awaiting orders from base.
At around 1300: CG said please proceed to calling port. Tosa confirmed whether to proceed to Singapore. CG said No, Proceed to Hua Lien for investigation. Master immediately informed managers and informed CG that Tosa was awaiting instructions from Managers to deviate from intended voyage.
All this while, vessel maintained a position of approx 35 to 40 miles from nearest Taiwan coast, by drifting, about 40 miles SE of Hua Lien, strong currents and rough sea pushed the vessel closer towards land and vessel maintained position as much as possible on course line, more than 36 miles off coast of Taiwan.
Between 17th /1300 and 18th / 1200:
Vessel maintained position, informed CG that Tosa was awaiting instructions from Managers. Also passed on Managers contact details to the CG. During this time CG also threatened the vessel that if Tosa did not follow their orders, the CG vessels and aircrafts would use force for Tosa to proceed to Port. They were insisting that Tosa proceed to Hua Lien immediately. Fearing threat to Vessel and crew, Master maintained position and awaited further instructions from Managers, assuring the CG119 of Tosa’s full cooperation at all times.
On 18th April 09, at around 1230 hrs:
Tosa received confirmation from Managers NYKSM, Singapore, to proceed to Hua Lien for further investigation, after they consulted with their P&I, H&M and legal and insurance departments.
At 1300 hrs:
Vessel proceeded to Hua lien, escorted by two CG vessels. Tosa retarded clock by 1 hour to make SMT = GMT +8.
1630:
Vessel arrived Hua Lien, 5 miles east of breakwater and drifted, using engines continuously. Strong currents and sea condition restricted vessel from approaching any closer. Local agent, P&I surveyor, H&M surveyor and Managers appointed lawyer boarded the vessel. All information requested by the surveyors was given, after consultation with lawyer.
The CG team of 13 members boarded vessel at around 1900 and carried out investigation until midnight. All information requested by CG was given, after consultation with the lawyer. The CG team left at 19th / 0010 hrs.
The Port State Control inspectors (2 persons) boarded at around 1945 hrs and departed at 2030 hrs. They informed master that they would return the following day for PSC inspection. They too asked for some ships information which was given after consulting the Lawyer.
19.4.09
0930: The Lawyer, surveyors, agent, C/Officer, 2/Officer and AB left vessel. They went for investigation / enquiry to CG Office at Hua Lien.
The C/O returned at 2330 hrs. The AB and 2/O were asked to stay back for further enquiry.
CO was asked questions related to the daily operations onboard and in particular if he knew anything as to what happened during the 12 to 4 watch of the said day. The Lawyer was present during this questioning.
20.4.09
Vessel was drifting about 8 miles off Hua Lien port the full day. A CG vessel was patrolling close by and monitoring all moves of Tosa. 2/o and AB were taken to local prosecutor’s office for enquiry and investigation. An interpreter was arranged. Tosa was accused of collision, negligence, manslaughter and hit and run. All information requested by CG, Lawyers, surveyor and Managers was passed on after consulting. Several crafts with lot of cameramen and other persons made circles of the vessel during the course of the day. None were allowed to board the vessel.
21.4.09
CG called up vessel and informed that divers will approach the vessel for inspection. The vessel maneuvered to 2.5 miles off the breakwater. The diver then realized that the current was more than 3 knots. The CG called the vessel and informed that underwater inspection / diving was cancelled as it was too dangerous for the diver.
However, a small CG raft closely inspected the entire ships side.
They found a white coloured buoy of size 1 foot height and 20 cms dia with a messenger line hanging at the rudder, they cut it and loaded it onto the CG vessel and took it away for investigation.
The vessel was stbd side alongside during discharge at Daesan. As per Managers requirement, a complete vessels report has to be sent on CD to the Managers every 6 months, which includes photos of ships side. The Chief Officer had taken pictures of the ships side while at Daesan. He had the photos of this buoy, marker and rope, which were noticed on 14th April. He had not informed Master as it slipped out of his mind. He was busy with discharge and then with paperwork after departure. He remembered the same only when the CG found the marker and the rope. The photos were immediately sent to the managers. It was later confirmed by the fishing trawler company that the buoy and rope did not belong to them.
Today, at 1400 hrs, the Chief of Coast Guards Capt. Fang came onboard to take a copy of the ships SVDR.
22.4.09
Master was called for investigation. On 21st, the Managers had arranged for a standby Master and 2/o, as they felt that the prosecutors were insisting that the Master was needed for the investigation. On 22nd, the standby Master and 2/O boarded the vessel and Self disembarked at 0800 hrs to proceed for investigation. There was no change of command or any hand over. The standby master was called in for the safety of the vessel, as informed by the COO of NYKSM.
Self was taken to the district prosecutor’s office. I was asked a few questions between 1030 hrs and 1245 hrs and 1355 to 1410 hrs. Most of my answers were – “I am not aware, as I was asleep / off duty / I had left standing instructions and night orders to be called if in doubt”. I was asked regarding a few navigation watch hand over / take over procedures onboard. The remaining questions were mostly on my opinion as Master, what I would do in such a situation. A lot of time was spent on the translation part. All communication by the prosecutor was in Chinese. The Lawyer was present during the entire proceeding. All papers were signed by self with remarks “I do not understand Chinese”. This was instructed by the Lawyer.
During this time, the 2/O and AB were questioned separately in different rooms.
23.4.09
2/O and AB were questioned. Self had to wait.
Today, the Hua Lien Port State Control boarded the vessel and carried out inspection between 1430 hrs and 1730 hrs. They gave the vessel a clean chit and found no deficiencies. Earlier, vessel also had a PSC inspection at Daesan on 14.4.09 with two deficiencies, both related to certification, involving Class. Annual Class surveys (NKK) were held at Fujairah, UAE on 17.3.09.
24.4.09
I was asked questions on the radar pictures obtained from the SVDR between 1000 hrs and 1215 hrs. Again, a lot of time was spent on translation. I had to explain a few radar terms as to what is CPA, TCPA, how the targets are plotted, what are the alarm settings on the radar etc.
At 1350, I was called in along with the Lawyer and told that I am now a witness in this case and that anything I say will be used as evidence against the word of the 2nd officer and AB. So I have to speak the truth. If I am found lying I will be jailed for 7 years or less. As I was not aware of what the prosecutor was talking about, he allowed me 10 minutes to discuss this with the lawyer in private and return.
The Lawyer suggested that I agree to be a witness as I was not around / off duty during the time of the incident. We then returned to the court room and I signed a Chinese paper which read the same thing as was explained by the lawyer. He read it out to me. I put a remark that I do not understand Chinese. I was then asked to remain in Taiwan and fully co-operate until the case is solved.
All the above occurred between 1350 and 1410 hrs.
26.4.09
Panama ambassador to China, a Panama Lawyer, deputy Mayor of Hualien and the ambassador’s assistant visited me at my hotel and took my statement. They were meeting with the External affairs ministry the following day and also the Chief Prosecutor. They have assured me of their full support and assistance in sorting out this matter as soon as possible.
28.4.09
2/O and AB were called for investigation. As per their information, same questions were repeated.
The Junior C/O (8 to 12 watch keeper who had handed over to 2/o) was also called for investigation today. He was asked similar questions as to his duties onboard, procedure of hand over and take over, what happened on midnight of the said day etc.
29.4.09
Today, the district Chief Prosecutor, along with the coast guards and local police, boarded Tosa around sunset time and carried out further investigation. They took pictures of the general layout of the vessel, tried out the GMDSS / distress system, and checked the radar operation and a few other items. They also simulated the situation with the CG boat coming close to the bow of Tosa and checked the range of visibility etc.
30.4.09
2/O, AB and self were called at 2315 hrs and asked if we had anything to supplement our previous records or statements. I had none.
Later, 2/O and AB were again called inside the court room at 2345 hrs. They were charged with negligence, manslaughter and hit and run. The 2/O was immediately hand cuffed and the AB has been told not to leave Hua Lien city without permission from the court.
1st May 09
Tosa sailed out around 1800 hrs, after signing a letter of undertaking with the owners of the fishing trawler. The Junior C/O returned to the vessel.
AB and self have been in a guest house since 2nd May. We are taken care of well, no harassment or ill treatment of any kind. The lawyer (who is based in Taipei) strongly advised us not to visit the 2/o in jail. The 2/o’s bail plea has been rejected. We are awaiting a hearing or a first verdict from the local court. No news yet. The Lawyer has asked me to be optimistic as I was not on duty and that the 2/O and AB have confirmed that they did not call me. He has asked me to be patient and cooperate with the authorities.
A few additional points:
1. I have seen the SVDR radar pictures. The targets seem very close, up to 3 cables off, but no judgement can be made as the clutter is too strong. The sea condition was rough, force 5, rough sea and swell. There appears to be no contact though, as the targets seem to have passed well clear. I have told the prosecutor that I am unable to make any judgement on scanty radar information as per the rules and in situations at such close range, the targets are usually monitored by visual, using binoculars.
2. The vessel passed Singapore on 7th May, underwater survey was carried out and no damage or scratches have been found anywhere, except anchor chain marks. The remaining length of the rope and some nets were found but already confirmed not belonging to the fishing trawler. The prosecutor had shown me a picture of the bulbous bow and asked me what the scratch marks were. I had told him that as per my knowledge they are anchor chain marks.
3. Unaware of the VHF communication recording of the SVDR during the incident as vessel did not have software to decode the recording. Had enquired with 2/O and AB, they had confirmed several times that neither did they hear any distress call nor receive any message regarding any assistance required. They had seen the boat pass well clear with all lights fully on.
4. The trawler named “SHINGTONG CHEN #86” was salvaged and towed to a nearby port called SUAO where survey was carried out only by the fishing company’s reps. Tosa’s reps were not allowed to join in the survey. The body of the Chief Engineer was found in the engine room bottom. The Master is still missing. Pictures of the fishing trawler after recovery are available, no signs of damage on the hull of the fishing boat whatsoever. Besides, a few crew of the fishing trawler have given statement that there was no actual contact between the two vessels. The actual reason for the capsize of the trawler is not known.
5. Understand that the Letter Of Undertaking was signed for an amount of USD five million. USD400,000/- each has been paid to the families of Master and Chief engineer.
6. Self have made a sea protest regarding this incident and got it notarized as advised by Lawyer and P&I.
6. Tosa has RT flex engines, whereby, revolutions of the ME can be adjusted very easily, for the purpose of bunker saving. Vessel was proceeding at 54 rpm from Daesan to Singapore as per Charterers instructions. (The max rpm is 71). However, daily, whilst vessel is at sea, rpm is increased to 66 for one hour in the morning and evening, for the purpose of soot blowing. At the time of interception by CG, vessel was gradually increasing speed for the morning soot blowing and speed had increased to almost 16.5 knots. The CG increased their speed to more than 17 knots and kept following the vessel.
Its almost two months now. There has been no progress. The 2/o is still in jail. The AB was called for investigation on 3rd June and released on a guarantee of usd16,000/-.
I am still not aware why i am asked to stay back in Taiwan. I was told that i am now being investigated to find out if Master has trained the 2/0 and AB adequately. My reply was that I am not responsible for their training, they are certified by their respective governments. So, i was told that the investigation is not over, have patience!!!!!”
Saturday, November 7, 2009
Roaring Lion came back a purring cat.
I attended a seminar hosted by my employers at the Ramada/ Residence in Powai. My first one with K Line.
I had gone there a smouldering volcano. Because ever since I joined the KLSM, there has been nothing going the way I wanted it to. The way I EXPECTED it to. I missed Aanya's birth. My promotion got delayed for no fault of mine. I had to fight to get off. I got put up in hotels I complained about. Twice over.
I had heard from people how you got to talk at seminars. And people I sailed with concurred with the hotel accomodations, the delays in signoff......and they said how there seemed to be no planning on releifs. how no messages were sent regarding releifs.... and i genuiley thought I would bring all that up in the seminar. I wanted to.
We had two days of people talking to us. I did end up with more knowledge than I came in. But I think there were too many presentations over two days. And in the end you lost the gist of most of them except those that really did pack a punch. Capt Goyal who was moderating had to cut short questions so they could keep upto schedule. It would have been better had there been fewer presentations and more time for interactive sessions. That way the views of the sea going staff would be heard better. Now it is just the seafarers listening and the office talking.
And after two long days came the Open forum. Silence for a few minutes.There were no responses to Capt Goyal's call for questions. And then I stretched my hand out for the mike. My heart started going dhud dhud. loud enough for me to hear it. I stood up, introduced myself and talked about how my promotion got delayed because the office lost my evaluation report. I think the point was pertinent because it could happen to anyone. And that is what I wanted to bring across so it doesnt happen again. But sadly I think I painted a very selfish picture talking about how things went wrong with me.
But then for the rest of the open forum there was not much I spoke. I was feeling very little. humbled. I started introspecting. how silly was my behaviour. I always knew I am very emotional and thoughts never went into my words. It always burst out. But somehow when I spoke in front of my fellow professionals, I felt I had let a lot of guys down to bring home something selfish.
I felt humbled by the whole experience. Seniors telling me sorry for what had happened with me. I almost felt I should not have brought it up. I hope I learn something from what happened there. And am not what Prem claims Brian called me- " a psycho chief officer"!
I had gone there a smouldering volcano. Because ever since I joined the KLSM, there has been nothing going the way I wanted it to. The way I EXPECTED it to. I missed Aanya's birth. My promotion got delayed for no fault of mine. I had to fight to get off. I got put up in hotels I complained about. Twice over.
I had heard from people how you got to talk at seminars. And people I sailed with concurred with the hotel accomodations, the delays in signoff......and they said how there seemed to be no planning on releifs. how no messages were sent regarding releifs.... and i genuiley thought I would bring all that up in the seminar. I wanted to.
We had two days of people talking to us. I did end up with more knowledge than I came in. But I think there were too many presentations over two days. And in the end you lost the gist of most of them except those that really did pack a punch. Capt Goyal who was moderating had to cut short questions so they could keep upto schedule. It would have been better had there been fewer presentations and more time for interactive sessions. That way the views of the sea going staff would be heard better. Now it is just the seafarers listening and the office talking.
And after two long days came the Open forum. Silence for a few minutes.There were no responses to Capt Goyal's call for questions. And then I stretched my hand out for the mike. My heart started going dhud dhud. loud enough for me to hear it. I stood up, introduced myself and talked about how my promotion got delayed because the office lost my evaluation report. I think the point was pertinent because it could happen to anyone. And that is what I wanted to bring across so it doesnt happen again. But sadly I think I painted a very selfish picture talking about how things went wrong with me.
But then for the rest of the open forum there was not much I spoke. I was feeling very little. humbled. I started introspecting. how silly was my behaviour. I always knew I am very emotional and thoughts never went into my words. It always burst out. But somehow when I spoke in front of my fellow professionals, I felt I had let a lot of guys down to bring home something selfish.
I felt humbled by the whole experience. Seniors telling me sorry for what had happened with me. I almost felt I should not have brought it up. I hope I learn something from what happened there. And am not what Prem claims Brian called me- " a psycho chief officer"!
Hebei Spirit
(This was written after listening to Capt Tandon's presentation at the KLSM seminar on 5 Nov 09)
Hebei Spirit was a case that shocked most if not every single person who has something to do with the profession.
Until now all that we learnt of the case was from the web and print. There were no actual audio visual content. But all the shock and awe the case inspired with the information I gleaned from available sources appeared a boring pale yellow once I saw what Capt Rajesh Tandon had to offer.
The presentation walked us through the entire incident. A computer generated path of the vessels made the whole incident vivid. To add to this he even had a clipping shot by someone on board. A short clip that shows a huge crane towering over a ship. The height of the boom in full fury made the structures on the Spirit appear really tiny.
I knew that it was a floating crane that caused the whole damage. But until I saw the visuals I never realised it looked so threatening.
The Marine spread was going in different directions before the incident. And it appears that they were heading for shelter in view of the inclement weather. But then they seemed to have been instructed to proceed on the voyage. And so they did.
As soon as it became apparent that the spread was going to pass very close to the Spirit, the Master and the ship's crew did all that they should and could have. Who would have even thought of slipping the cable when the spread was passing clear of you. And then suddenly the tow wire parts. The crane drifts on to the Spirit and makes contact on the sides of the 3 tanks that were the cargo tanks on the port side
Capt Tandon told us how the KMST went about the investigation in a very prejudiced manner asking very persuasive questions. The main criticism by the KMST was that the Marine spread was restricted in its ability to manoeuvre and that the Hebei Spirit should have weighed its anchor and run its engine astern or should have shortened scope and dragged its anchor. They even wanted the Hebei Spirit to have slipped its anchor as soon as it realised that the tow line had parted.
The Regional District Court exonerated the Master and the Mate on 23 Jun 08. On their way to the airport, an exit ban was imposed on the two persumably at the behest of the Prosecuting office and Samsung Heavy Industries. Well, what cannot be done if you account for 33% of the DPR Koreas GDP! That is what the Samsung share is! KMST felt the leaks should have been plugged.How on earth can a 1.2m x 1.2m hole on the ship side be plugged? They wanted internal transfer of the cargo. This was already done by the Hebei Spirit and all available tanks were just a little under 100%. Could they not have opened the ballast tank man-holes and then used the pumps to pump out oil on deck so that it drains into the ballast tanks.The IG inlet valves should have been isolated and pressure released. Who in their right minds would take a chance with a flammable atmosphere? What an IG does is prevent fire. You take out the IG and you are letting in fresh air. And with the Korean CG officials allegedly disregarding safe procedures and smoking on deck, we definitly would have had the worst ever fire and probably an explosion leading to the worst ever oil spill.
This was the first time all the Indian Shipping Companies came together for a cause. And it had the support of the various international bodies. Capt Chawla was recognised for his professional efforts and awarded 'The Shipmaster of the Year - Runner up'. Shyam Chetan and Capt Chawla are back home. They can sail again. But cannot call Korea. Who would want to call Korea if officers of ships calling there end up in Jail for no fault of theirs.
For the record, even Capt Glenn Aroza sailed his ship out of Daesan before he ended up in a Taiwanese Jail.
I would like to salute Capt Rajesh Tandon and every one else involved for having stood by the officers and brought them home. In these days when a Master could be in any country's jail because the third mate sneezed, it is the assurance that there are people back on land who would fight for your rights that lets you discharge your duties to the best of our professional judgement.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gL7A1nOOMg
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KK1x6NqOHsU
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=66J_MazbAfE
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