Capt Glenn Aroza in Jail!

I did not write this. I am copying a mail I received. But what you read is very relevant.

For the record I would also like to share an incident I can vouch for. This ship was on a voyage from the Gulf to Japan. A VLCC. When the ship reached Japan the superintendent in charge of the ship calls up the Master to inform him of a claim from a Taiwanese fishing vessel . The VLCC allegedly collided with the fishing vessel. But when the Master asked the office for a time and position of the incident, it turned out that the VLCC was never even there at that time. The case died a natural death.

And then there was the case of Capt Goel who was in Jail for about 3 years sometime in 1996 for an alleged collision during the 3rd Officers Watch!

QUOTE

MOST IMMEDIATE TODAY CAPT. GLEN PATRICK AROZA, MASTER M.T.TOSA, NYK SHIPS -DETENTION IN HUALIEN, TAIWAN SINCE 18 APRIL 2009

“CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS OF ‘ALLEGED’ INVOLVEMENT OF VLCC ‘TOSA’ IN A CLOSE QUARTERS SITUATION WITH A TAIWANESE FISHING TRAWLER

Tosa is a 299996 dwt VLCC delivered on 31.3.08, built in Japan, registered in Panama and managed by NYK ship management, Singapore. LOA 333 mts, breadth 60 mts and depth 29 mts.

Tosa sailed out from Daesan, South Korea on 14.4.09, RFA at 2200 LT, after completing discharge of crude oil, enroute to Singapore for bunkers and further orders.
SMT = GMT+9 (from departure Daesan until 18th April).
TAIWAN MAINTAINS GMT + 8.

17.4.09

0920 – Tosa noticed a Taiwanese Coast Guard vessel “CG 119” coming very close to port quarter, almost 2 cables. Tosa called up CG and asked intentions, if all was OK. CG asked for Tosa’s 0200 hrs position, last port and next port. (Vessel was proceeding at a speed of approx 13.5 knots, the location was off East Coast of Taiwan, in approx 23 degrees latitude, about 45 to 50 miles south east of a port called Hua Lien.)

CG also informed Tosa that there was a collision with a fishing boat at night and two Taiwanese persons (Master and Chief Engineer) were missing, whether Tosa was aware of it. Tosa said no.

Master called up Chief Officer. C/O said that the 2/o had informed him at 0400 hrs that some fishing vessels had come close to Tosa, so he took evasive action and had passed clear.

Master informed Managers (Superintendent Incharge Mr. A. Sarpal) over the phone about the incident and communication with CG, and then on, kept informing Managers of the situation both via phone and email.

0945 - Master called 2/o on bridge and when enquired, 2/O said that there were a few fishing boats in the vicinity, 2 on his stbd side and 2 on his port side, all were maintaining more than 1 mile CPA. Suddenly he saw that the boats on the port side were coming very close and trying to cross the bow from port to stbd, so he altered to port and passed the boats at about 3 to 4 cables and then saw them pass well clear, he also monitored them for sometime until they passed clear and monitored their lights. The above occurred between 0030 and 0100 ships time. When asked why he did not inform master, he said it all happened so suddenly and that he had handled the situation and did not see the reason to call master. (The 2/O is a Bangladeshi age 28, with 2nd mates license and near coastal Mates license issued by Bangladesh. Last two trips of 6 months each as 3rd Officer. First ship as 2nd Officer, first VLCC. Has been onboard since 26th February, already made a similar voyage from S.Korea to Arab Gulf and back).

Master also called AB Edwardo (Filipino, aged 31) and he also narrated similar situation. He was hand steering from 0020 until past 0100.

Both 2/O and AB have given written statements, which were forwarded to Managers. Master also made initial statement basis information given by 2/O and AB, same has been forwarded to Managers.

Earlier, Master had left night orders at 16th/2315 hrs and gone to sleep. Masters standing orders clearly stated CPA of 2 miles in open waters and 1 mile in restricted waters and all conditions for informing / calling master and acknowledged by all Officers onboard. In this case, the vessel was in open sea and the nearest land was 21 miles off. There was no traffic in the vicinity except a few fishing boats here and there. The sea condition was rough sea and swell, force 5, seas on tosa’s port quarter. Currents were against, vessel was doing a speed of approx 12 knots.

Vessel was continuing on passage, CG was following the vessel very closely…

In between 0930 and 1045:
CG asked for more information of vessel, name of Owners, cargo onboard, draft, Masters name, etc. All information as requested was passed onto CG. A record of all vhf communication was maintained in the GMDSS log.

Tosa also confirmed to CG that vessel was maintaining GMT+9 and that the there was a time difference of 1 hour between ships time and Taiwan time. Besides, the alleged location of capsizing was one hour away from Tosa’ sposition at the said time. (In GMT)

At about 1000 hrs:
Tosa received a navtex from Japan radio which stated sunken fishing boat in said position and said time. Tosa was approximately 1 hour away from this position, at the alleged time of capsizing of the fishing trawler.

The location of the alleged capsizing / sinking was approximately 21 n.miles off a Japanese island named Utsuori Shima, about more than 50 miles off the North Eastern coast of Taiwan.

At about 1100: CG asked Tosa to stop as they wanted to carry out inspection of ships side and board the vessel for some enquiry. Master immediately informed managers and stopped the vessel and fully cooperated with the Coast Guards.

Alcohol check of 2/O and AB was carried out, nil record. At around noon, SVDR information was saved.

The coast guards carried out inspection of the ships side, but could not board the vessel as the sea condition was rough.

At around 1230 hrs: CG thanked Tosa for cooperation and said sorry for interfering with voyage and that they did not find any crash marks on the ships side. When Tosa asked whether vessel could continue on voyage to Singapore, CG said please wait as awaiting orders from base.

At around 1300: CG said please proceed to calling port. Tosa confirmed whether to proceed to Singapore. CG said No, Proceed to Hua Lien for investigation. Master immediately informed managers and informed CG that Tosa was awaiting instructions from Managers to deviate from intended voyage.

All this while, vessel maintained a position of approx 35 to 40 miles from nearest Taiwan coast, by drifting, about 40 miles SE of Hua Lien, strong currents and rough sea pushed the vessel closer towards land and vessel maintained position as much as possible on course line, more than 36 miles off coast of Taiwan.

Between 17th /1300 and 18th / 1200:
Vessel maintained position, informed CG that Tosa was awaiting instructions from Managers. Also passed on Managers contact details to the CG. During this time CG also threatened the vessel that if Tosa did not follow their orders, the CG vessels and aircrafts would use force for Tosa to proceed to Port. They were insisting that Tosa proceed to Hua Lien immediately. Fearing threat to Vessel and crew, Master maintained position and awaited further instructions from Managers, assuring the CG119 of Tosa’s full cooperation at all times.

On 18th April 09, at around 1230 hrs:
Tosa received confirmation from Managers NYKSM, Singapore, to proceed to Hua Lien for further investigation, after they consulted with their P&I, H&M and legal and insurance departments.

At 1300 hrs:
Vessel proceeded to Hua lien, escorted by two CG vessels. Tosa retarded clock by 1 hour to make SMT = GMT +8.

1630:
Vessel arrived Hua Lien, 5 miles east of breakwater and drifted, using engines continuously. Strong currents and sea condition restricted vessel from approaching any closer. Local agent, P&I surveyor, H&M surveyor and Managers appointed lawyer boarded the vessel. All information requested by the surveyors was given, after consultation with lawyer.

The CG team of 13 members boarded vessel at around 1900 and carried out investigation until midnight. All information requested by CG was given, after consultation with the lawyer. The CG team left at 19th / 0010 hrs.

The Port State Control inspectors (2 persons) boarded at around 1945 hrs and departed at 2030 hrs. They informed master that they would return the following day for PSC inspection. They too asked for some ships information which was given after consulting the Lawyer.

19.4.09
0930: The Lawyer, surveyors, agent, C/Officer, 2/Officer and AB left vessel. They went for investigation / enquiry to CG Office at Hua Lien.

The C/O returned at 2330 hrs. The AB and 2/O were asked to stay back for further enquiry.

CO was asked questions related to the daily operations onboard and in particular if he knew anything as to what happened during the 12 to 4 watch of the said day. The Lawyer was present during this questioning.
20.4.09
Vessel was drifting about 8 miles off Hua Lien port the full day. A CG vessel was patrolling close by and monitoring all moves of Tosa. 2/o and AB were taken to local prosecutor’s office for enquiry and investigation. An interpreter was arranged. Tosa was accused of collision, negligence, manslaughter and hit and run. All information requested by CG, Lawyers, surveyor and Managers was passed on after consulting. Several crafts with lot of cameramen and other persons made circles of the vessel during the course of the day. None were allowed to board the vessel.

21.4.09
CG called up vessel and informed that divers will approach the vessel for inspection. The vessel maneuvered to 2.5 miles off the breakwater. The diver then realized that the current was more than 3 knots. The CG called the vessel and informed that underwater inspection / diving was cancelled as it was too dangerous for the diver.
However, a small CG raft closely inspected the entire ships side.
They found a white coloured buoy of size 1 foot height and 20 cms dia with a messenger line hanging at the rudder, they cut it and loaded it onto the CG vessel and took it away for investigation.

The vessel was stbd side alongside during discharge at Daesan. As per Managers requirement, a complete vessels report has to be sent on CD to the Managers every 6 months, which includes photos of ships side. The Chief Officer had taken pictures of the ships side while at Daesan. He had the photos of this buoy, marker and rope, which were noticed on 14th April. He had not informed Master as it slipped out of his mind. He was busy with discharge and then with paperwork after departure. He remembered the same only when the CG found the marker and the rope. The photos were immediately sent to the managers. It was later confirmed by the fishing trawler company that the buoy and rope did not belong to them.

Today, at 1400 hrs, the Chief of Coast Guards Capt. Fang came onboard to take a copy of the ships SVDR.

22.4.09
Master was called for investigation. On 21st, the Managers had arranged for a standby Master and 2/o, as they felt that the prosecutors were insisting that the Master was needed for the investigation. On 22nd, the standby Master and 2/O boarded the vessel and Self disembarked at 0800 hrs to proceed for investigation. There was no change of command or any hand over. The standby master was called in for the safety of the vessel, as informed by the COO of NYKSM.

Self was taken to the district prosecutor’s office. I was asked a few questions between 1030 hrs and 1245 hrs and 1355 to 1410 hrs. Most of my answers were – “I am not aware, as I was asleep / off duty / I had left standing instructions and night orders to be called if in doubt”. I was asked regarding a few navigation watch hand over / take over procedures onboard. The remaining questions were mostly on my opinion as Master, what I would do in such a situation. A lot of time was spent on the translation part. All communication by the prosecutor was in Chinese. The Lawyer was present during the entire proceeding. All papers were signed by self with remarks “I do not understand Chinese”. This was instructed by the Lawyer.
During this time, the 2/O and AB were questioned separately in different rooms.

23.4.09
2/O and AB were questioned. Self had to wait.
Today, the Hua Lien Port State Control boarded the vessel and carried out inspection between 1430 hrs and 1730 hrs. They gave the vessel a clean chit and found no deficiencies. Earlier, vessel also had a PSC inspection at Daesan on 14.4.09 with two deficiencies, both related to certification, involving Class. Annual Class surveys (NKK) were held at Fujairah, UAE on 17.3.09.

24.4.09
I was asked questions on the radar pictures obtained from the SVDR between 1000 hrs and 1215 hrs. Again, a lot of time was spent on translation. I had to explain a few radar terms as to what is CPA, TCPA, how the targets are plotted, what are the alarm settings on the radar etc.

At 1350, I was called in along with the Lawyer and told that I am now a witness in this case and that anything I say will be used as evidence against the word of the 2nd officer and AB. So I have to speak the truth. If I am found lying I will be jailed for 7 years or less. As I was not aware of what the prosecutor was talking about, he allowed me 10 minutes to discuss this with the lawyer in private and return.

The Lawyer suggested that I agree to be a witness as I was not around / off duty during the time of the incident. We then returned to the court room and I signed a Chinese paper which read the same thing as was explained by the lawyer. He read it out to me. I put a remark that I do not understand Chinese. I was then asked to remain in Taiwan and fully co-operate until the case is solved.
All the above occurred between 1350 and 1410 hrs.

26.4.09
Panama ambassador to China, a Panama Lawyer, deputy Mayor of Hualien and the ambassador’s assistant visited me at my hotel and took my statement. They were meeting with the External affairs ministry the following day and also the Chief Prosecutor. They have assured me of their full support and assistance in sorting out this matter as soon as possible.

28.4.09
2/O and AB were called for investigation. As per their information, same questions were repeated.
The Junior C/O (8 to 12 watch keeper who had handed over to 2/o) was also called for investigation today. He was asked similar questions as to his duties onboard, procedure of hand over and take over, what happened on midnight of the said day etc.

29.4.09
Today, the district Chief Prosecutor, along with the coast guards and local police, boarded Tosa around sunset time and carried out further investigation. They took pictures of the general layout of the vessel, tried out the GMDSS / distress system, and checked the radar operation and a few other items. They also simulated the situation with the CG boat coming close to the bow of Tosa and checked the range of visibility etc.

30.4.09
2/O, AB and self were called at 2315 hrs and asked if we had anything to supplement our previous records or statements. I had none.

Later, 2/O and AB were again called inside the court room at 2345 hrs. They were charged with negligence, manslaughter and hit and run. The 2/O was immediately hand cuffed and the AB has been told not to leave Hua Lien city without permission from the court.

1st May 09
Tosa sailed out around 1800 hrs, after signing a letter of undertaking with the owners of the fishing trawler. The Junior C/O returned to the vessel.

AB and self have been in a guest house since 2nd May. We are taken care of well, no harassment or ill treatment of any kind. The lawyer (who is based in Taipei) strongly advised us not to visit the 2/o in jail. The 2/o’s bail plea has been rejected. We are awaiting a hearing or a first verdict from the local court. No news yet. The Lawyer has asked me to be optimistic as I was not on duty and that the 2/O and AB have confirmed that they did not call me. He has asked me to be patient and cooperate with the authorities.

A few additional points:
1. I have seen the SVDR radar pictures. The targets seem very close, up to 3 cables off, but no judgement can be made as the clutter is too strong. The sea condition was rough, force 5, rough sea and swell. There appears to be no contact though, as the targets seem to have passed well clear. I have told the prosecutor that I am unable to make any judgement on scanty radar information as per the rules and in situations at such close range, the targets are usually monitored by visual, using binoculars.
2. The vessel passed Singapore on 7th May, underwater survey was carried out and no damage or scratches have been found anywhere, except anchor chain marks. The remaining length of the rope and some nets were found but already confirmed not belonging to the fishing trawler. The prosecutor had shown me a picture of the bulbous bow and asked me what the scratch marks were. I had told him that as per my knowledge they are anchor chain marks.
3. Unaware of the VHF communication recording of the SVDR during the incident as vessel did not have software to decode the recording. Had enquired with 2/O and AB, they had confirmed several times that neither did they hear any distress call nor receive any message regarding any assistance required. They had seen the boat pass well clear with all lights fully on.
4. The trawler named “SHINGTONG CHEN #86” was salvaged and towed to a nearby port called SUAO where survey was carried out only by the fishing company’s reps. Tosa’s reps were not allowed to join in the survey. The body of the Chief Engineer was found in the engine room bottom. The Master is still missing. Pictures of the fishing trawler after recovery are available, no signs of damage on the hull of the fishing boat whatsoever. Besides, a few crew of the fishing trawler have given statement that there was no actual contact between the two vessels. The actual reason for the capsize of the trawler is not known.
5. Understand that the Letter Of Undertaking was signed for an amount of USD five million. USD400,000/- each has been paid to the families of Master and Chief engineer.
6. Self have made a sea protest regarding this incident and got it notarized as advised by Lawyer and P&I.
6. Tosa has RT flex engines, whereby, revolutions of the ME can be adjusted very easily, for the purpose of bunker saving. Vessel was proceeding at 54 rpm from Daesan to Singapore as per Charterers instructions. (The max rpm is 71). However, daily, whilst vessel is at sea, rpm is increased to 66 for one hour in the morning and evening, for the purpose of soot blowing. At the time of interception by CG, vessel was gradually increasing speed for the morning soot blowing and speed had increased to almost 16.5 knots. The CG increased their speed to more than 17 knots and kept following the vessel.

Its almost two months now. There has been no progress. The 2/o is still in jail. The AB was called for investigation on 3rd June and released on a guarantee of usd16,000/-.

I am still not aware why i am asked to stay back in Taiwan. I was told that i am now being investigated to find out if Master has trained the 2/0 and AB adequately. My reply was that I am not responsible for their training, they are certified by their respective governments. So, i was told that the investigation is not over, have patience!!!!!”